Introduction
The use of contracts has now become not only a central means for the delivery of public services but has at last attracted the academic attention it deserves.
1 However, there has been limited discussion in the legal literature of one field of such contracting which has both a high as competitive goals, for example the use of universal service funds through which competing companies can bid to provide socially necessary services at the lowest cost. If this is the most plausible understanding of the role of rail franchising, it raises issues which are at the heart of the current debates concerning contractual governance. In particular, it raises the issue of trust in relation to the provision of public services.
The use of franchises is a response to a lack of trust in the ability of the privatised operators to maximise returns for shareholders whilst at the same time maintaining public service provision. This lack of trust was exacerbated by the model adopted for privatisation, in which the formerly unitary British Rail was split into a large number of separate companies linked by contract. The use of franchises thus represents regulation designed to ensure that at least some form of trust can be maintained after privatisation and fragmentation of the rail industry. As Baldwin, Cave and Lodge have pointed out, one objective may be to 'avoid the restrictiveness associated with classical command and control regulation while, nevertheless, enabling some degree of control to be retained.' It also permits competition for the market rather than within the market, thereby maintaining the benefits of competitive pressure. 6 As we shall discuss, control may be exercised in a number of ways in a rail franchise. A principal means is through detailed specifications for the service. The expectation would be that effective monitoring of the operator's performance in meeting specifications would engender trust between the contracting parties; over time, increasing trust in the operator's ability to meet expectations would correspondingly reduce the necessity to continue to prescribe or strictly enforce the precise content of specifications and other terms in the contract in future. There is of course a vast literature in the study of contract relating to trust, from Durkheim onwards; one summary which is particularly apposite here comes from Hugh
Collins:
The … effect of trust between the parties is that it reduces the need to guard against disappointment by specifying in detail the precise content of the reciprocal undertakings and then monitoring performance closely. In the presence of trust, it will be assumed that the intention to minimize disappointment will lead the other to fulfil reasonable expectations without the need to supply particulars of every aspect of those expectations and then check upon compliance with the terms of the contract. In other words, the transaction costs of contractual specificity and monitoring can be reduced by the presence of trust … In short, trust functions as an antidote to transaction costs.
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If it was envisaged that franchising would ensure trust for the public through government oversight and trust between contracting parties through performance monitoring leading to a reduction in contractual specificity and transaction costs, the experience of rail franchising
has not engendered such levels of trust, compromising contractual governance and the achievement of regulatory goals. As we shall discuss, trust leading to flexibility in the contract has been undermined by a tendency to specify in extreme detail the normative requirements applying to the delivery of rail services, a problem which has bedevilled rail franchises. Further, lack of effective performance monitoring from the outset in order to increase trust and reduce excessive monitoring over time has been a major issue exacerbating misplaced levels of control throughout the franchise duration; for example, through threatening regimes of penalties and termination which have, themselves, been largely ineffective. As a result, one of the great merits claimed for franchising as a regulatory strategy, namely flexibility and adaptability to the specific circumstances of its operation over 7 Regulating Contracts (1999) , 100-101; see also 3, 98-102, 110-4, 129. time, has instead manifested certain characteristics of that often mythical beast, 'command and control regulation' rather than permitting the service provider to judge changing market conditions and to innovate.
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'Command and control' regulation has come under massive criticism in recent years suggesting that 'smarter' forms of regulation which involve a more reflexive set of relations between regulator and regulatee have major advantages. 9 As we shall discuss below, having identified the objectives of franchising, we have to ask whether franchising in its current form is always the 'smartest' way of achieving them. Regulation theory has identified franchises as having certain characteristics which offer an effective regulatory strategy provided they do not come to resemble certain less successful forms of command and control. However, it may be questioned whether the circumstances surrounding rail provision such as privatisation, competition for the market and detailed contractual forms could have rendered franchising effective across the spectrum of rail services provided. By contrast, there has been virtually no consideration of the potential and characteristics of other modes of regulation which could, in fact, be more responsive to public service demands. As we shall discuss, concessions can provide more appropriate specifications and risk allocation and which respond to regional needs, conditions which may be more conducive to fostering greater trust.
These contracts do not avoid all of the problems of command and control regulation but recent experience suggests that they are worthy of detailed consideration as a regulatory strategy. At the very least, they reveal that the traditional franchise is not the only mode of regulation being deployed; there are important variations that must be examined.
The fostering of trust in regulatory relationships is also a major task for a procedural public law, especially where, as in the case of rail, there are complex regulatory relationships UK public sector bodies are prohibited from bidding, though this has not prevented public enterprises from other European countries obtaining a substantial number of UK franchises.
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S.26 of the Act empowers the minister to select franchise holders from those who submit tenders but does not require a competitive tendering process. The key decisions are very much left to the minister rather than being subject to detailed legal provisions and clear legal constraints. However, the minister is required under amendments made by the Railways Act 2005 to issue a statement of policy on the exercise of his powers in relation to tendering.
14 This states that it is likely that a tendering process will be used, except where this is not practicable because of potential disruption of services, or where tendering would not be conducive to the effective administration of a sustainable and well-resourced programme of franchise competition, or to the fulfilment of government objectives in relation to rail transport. 15 In these circumstances a direct award will be made; as we shall see below, direct awards have been made extensively in recent years.
Most UK public contracting has been transformed by the EU public procurement rules.
16
Historically, the provision of rail passenger services was considered to be exempt from the procurement directives. However, in practice franchises were typically awarded under the would improve the quality of services or cost-efficiency. 22 The legal basis for rail franchising thus continues to impose only a patchwork of limited procedural restrictions on the powers of the Secretary of State in the award of franchises.
The performance of rail franchising
Despite daily media reports to the contrary, passenger rail services have clearly had some major successes in recent years with passenger numbers increasing by 60% over the past ten years, and journeys rising from 600 million in the mid-1980s to over 1.6 billion journeys in 2014-15. 23 This may in part be attributable to marketing and service improvement by the franchise holders, although the reasons for the increase are highly complex and include changes in the national economy and in lifestyles. 24 However, the franchising process has encountered serious problems. First it will be necessary to examine the relationship between franchising and competition.
Franchising and competition
It is, of course, in the very nature of franchising that it restricts competition in the provision of services to consumers through providing near-exclusive rights to the provision of services in the area covered. 
Specification of service requirements and financial arrangements
The service requirements for franchise holders are set out in an astonishing level of detail. expected that the Franchising Director would prescribe service specifications to a degree appropriate to the level of competition, for example, with detailed specifications where the operator was a near monopolist to substitute for market pressure but only service specifications necessary to ensure good value for money where there was market pressure.
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Yet, for many years, detailed service specifications appear to have been applied across all franchises, irrespective of levels of competition achieved. It brings into question how accurate the assumptions underpinning risk allocation were at the outset as well as whether risk can be effectively managed in the long-term business relation;
it appears that such mechanisms have been used to deal with generally foreseeable issues rather than exceptionally unforeseeable events beyond the control of the contracting parties.
The Brown Report on the future of franchising recommended that revised risk sharing arrangements be adopted with the Government retaining elements of exogenous revenue risks, for example those related to fluctuations in GDP, and this has been the approach adopted in more recent franchises. Management contracts with the Department bearing such risks have also been adopted for some direct awards where disruption is caused by infrastructure work; this is most notably the case for the Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR) management contract covering Southern services, the largest of all franchises. This has not been successful; the GTR contract has been plagued by disruption caused by a combination of major infrastructure work and industrial action. It has been suggested that the management contract limits the incentives on the operator to settle disputes, although the contact also contains a system of penalties which could be used by the government, a point to which we shall return below. Overall, the Transport Committee has concluded that, in rail franchising in general, although '[t]he transfer of financial risk to the private sector was a central premise of rail franchising, … historically there has been a relatively low level of financial risk from operating a passenger rail franchise.' However, risk for the private operator may now be increasing due to falling profit margins and the increasing size and complexity of franchises.
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A different approach has been adopted for areas of urban railway, the London Overground,
Crossrail and Merseyrail, in the form of a concession. Merseyrail, and these public bodies set fares. In principle, the service specification is to be more detailed than that in a franchise agreement, but in practice, as noted above, franchises in fact contain much greater specification of the details of the services required than was originally intended, thus reducing the formal difference between the two types of contract.
The use of concessions so far seems to have worked reasonably well, and we shall return to the subject when we discuss alternatives to franchising below.
Fragmentation
A further very important problem of franchising is fragmentation of the rail industry; this differentiates the UK model of rail privatisation from that adopted in other nations.
Fragmentation has created problems of management coordination between Network Rail and service operation, resulting in high costs in the form of increased fares and lack of public support. 40 Thus the McNulty Report commissioned by the Department into value for money in GB rail found that:
[h]aving multiple industry players, together with misaligned incentives and the existing railway culture, has made it difficult to secure co-operative effort at operational interfaces, or active industry engagement in cross-industry activities… 40 'Rail Franchising', ch. 6. 45 This issue of how best to minimise the effects of fragmentation is likely to be a major concern in the development of future institutional and regulatory policy relating to rail, and we shall return to it in our recommendations for reform.
Transparency and the franchising process
It thus appears that there have been serious difficulties in balancing competition and flexibility for train operators with regulation to maintain rail's role as a nationwide public service. It will be recalled that the burgeoning literature on the use of contractual modes of governance in the UK has had as one of its major themes the requirement that contracts for public services are also responsive in the sense of complying with public law norms of transparency. This would involve some element of public input in the drawing up of the contracts, especially if they are seen as a means of implementing public interest norms which may be highly contestable. It would also imply that, unlike in the case of ordinary private law contracts, the maximum possible amount of information is made publicly available, including the content of the contracts themselves subject only to deletions for reasons of commercial confidentiality where absolutely necessary. Finally, it would imply that there is a means of monitoring the operation of the contracts which is accessible to interests other than merely the two parties to the contract. It should be emphasised that this is different from the question of whether or not contracts should be awarded by competitive tendering. Such tendering may be an important means of achieving pro-competition goals and value for money and may also Rail franchising is more transparent than the previous arrangements under British Rail. Costs were often opaque, the compensation under the Public Service Obligation introduced by the Railways Act 1974 was not broken down in any detail and did not refer to particular groups of services but rather acted as a top-down cash limit, and the internal relations within a unified enterprise (albeit one with marked internal divisions) were not publicly set out or structured.
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Invitations to tender for new franchise awards are published on the Department's website, accompanied by a press release. A guide to the franchise process has been published setting out the procedures which the Department will follow in making awards. 47 However, the lack of transparency in the conduct of tendering processes is evidenced by the InterCity West Coast process and was heavily criticised in the official report into what had gone wrong.
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The subsequent Brown review of franchising recommended that an overt and direct weighting be given to quality factors with greater transparency. In addition to problems of transparency in the franchise procurement process, the Transport Committee has also pointed to a lack of information after the franchise award. The above discussion suggests that rail franchising has met with a two-fold failure as a means of responsive contractual government. It has not succeeded in providing a form of regulation which offers flexibility and scope for innovation for operators, nor has it met the goals of increased transparency. Have other systems elsewhere performed better in meeting these objectives?
Overseas experience
In the UK there has been very little use of experience elsewhere as a guide to developing a system which combines a degree of competition for the market with the protection of public service objectives. However, this has been the practice for many years in other European systems. The first example is that of Sweden, which split its rail network into a number of different enterprises even before the UK did so. The second is that of Italy which has a long history of the use of contractual instruments to protect public service goals. It is, of course, necessary to employ international comparative work with caution and some of the major characteristics of the other systems described cannot be duplicated in the UK. As we shall discuss, examples are the incremental approach to liberalisation adopted in Sweden and the role of constitutional provisions as a basis for public service norms (and a public service culture) in Italy. However, it is still possible to draw lessons from the overseas experience described here.
Sweden
The Swedish railway was split in 1988 into two parts; the National Rail Administration, Banverket, was responsible for the infrastructure and was retained in public ownership as a government agency and Statens Järnvägar (SJ) was a separate body responsible for running railway services. The planning and subsidy of regional services was delegated to regional transport authorities and they were given the power (though not the duty) to procure them industry and to hold the cost for procuring unprofitable railway services as low as possible.
The use of deregulation to strengthen the consumer perspective has at most been of secondary importance.' 62 This is reflected in the gradual process of liberalisation.
There is also an important difference in the nature of the contracts used for the provision of rail services. In the case of regional services, gross-cost contracts are used by the regional authorities. These are similar to the concessions discussed above according to which authorities carry the risk, pay a specified sum to the operator to provide the services, set the fares and plan the services. The operators bid for the lowest amount of subsidy required to operate these services, although in some cases there are profit-sharing arrangements to stimulate performance and penalties are employed. The contracts are relatively short-term (3-5 years with the possibility of a short extension), and planning is for the regional authorities; the latter also provide the rolling-stock through a jointly-owned leasing company so entry costs are low. 63 Longer distance services are contracted out by the infrastructure company; in this case net-cost contracts are used with the bidder retaining passenger revenue and estimating any subsidy needed to cover the gap between costs and revenues, and unforeseen deficits cannot be refunded. Bidders have more freedom to shape the services, but they are fixed for the duration of the contract. Evaluation of bids includes a quality element, and there are performance-related payments. Contract duration has been as short as one year but is now normally from three to twelve years with an option for a short extension.
64
How successful has this system of competitive procurement been? It has been subject to some of the same problems as those in the UK; for example failure to perform by bidders, predatory behaviours by bidders, a scarcity of bidders and reduction in connecting services.
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However, it does seem to have been more successful in reducing the cost to the public of the rail system; as mentioned above, this, rather than increased competition to benefit the consumer, was the major justification for the reforms of the Swedish rail system. Thus, whilst support from the state has grown in proportion to passenger traffic, this has been in the form of support for infrastructure investment rather than operating subsidies, and it has been suggested that the increased costs of vertical separation have been more than offset by the savings from competitive tendering. 66 This is in marked contrast to the UK where the costs of the rail system have substantially increased since privatisation and fragmentation, and are now double in real terms the levels of 1985-86. 67 Indeed, Sweden was one of the comparator nations used in the benchmarking exercise carried out by the value for money study commissioned by the Department for Transport. It found that GB rail costs would need to be reduced by around 40 percent to meet those of the comparators, and that there was a substantially higher taxpayer subsidy per passenger-kilometre in the UK.
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There are two lessons to be drawn from the Swedish experience. The first is that of the central role of regional authorities in both the development of the service requirements and in tendering. The second is that there has been an extensive reliance on gross-cost contracts with risk retained by the public authority; further, at regional level there has not been any attempt at the complex risk sharing arrangements adopted in the UK. The Swedish experience is, On balance, however, the Swedish arrangements have proved less problematic and have achieved greater legitimacy than those in the UK for three reasons: the extensive role of regional authorities; the limited degree of risk transfer (in contrast to franchises but comparable to concessions in the UK); and the successful reduction in costs through competitive tendering.
Italy
The Italian rail network is extensive, with a similar size to that of the UK. It has invested heavily in new high-speed lines linking Turin, Milan, Rome and Naples with high capacity, but there is also an extensive network of regional and local lines serving small populations and performing an important public service role. 70 One radical difference from the UK is that constitutional provisions form the background to decisions on managing the rail network. concern technical issues regarding the right to operate) and the operator must also agree a concession with the infrastructure owner.
The institutional structures for regulation in Italy are also highly complex, involving the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, the antitrust authorities and regional and local authorities. 73 Since the beginning of 2014 an important actor has also been l'Autorità di regolazione dei trasporti [ART], a new independent regulatory commission which is responsible for regulating access to infrastructure, the service regime and passengers' rights across all areas of transport.
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Open access competition has been introduced for the high-speed lines and, after initial difficulties, is now a major feature of their operation. The first attempt at such access failed after strong opposition by FS.
75
The second open-access operator, Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori (NTV), competes solely on the high-speed network and was more successful after the Italian antitrust authority had settled its case against the FS Group on terms requiring much more beneficial conditions for access than those originally proposed by the latter. improvements and has achieved considerable success. 77 Thus the Italian system has permitted much greater open access competition than the UK.
Public service requirements are also an important part of the regulatory landscape in Italy, reflecting the constitutional norms referred to above. However, there is no agreed single definition of universal service in this context. 78 This vagueness has been criticised by the antitrust authority as blurring the distinction between competitive and universal services and so making the introduction of competition more difficult. 79 Definition of public service obligations is for the ministry and the regions, now in conjunction with the ART which is also responsible for issuing rules relating to quality standards such as ticketing, passenger information and treatment of delays. The ministry was required by a law of 2007 to conduct an investigation into the balance between costs and receipts of different services, but this has never been made public. 80 The main responsibility for public service requirements lies with two levels of government. For long-and medium-distance services, these requirements are set out in law and in the public service contract between the state and Trenitalia. 81 That applying up to 2016 was a document of 20 pages and is publicly available; it set out general 77 See Angela Stefania Bergantino, 'Incumbents and New Entrants' in Finger and Messulam, eds, Rail Economics, Policy and Regulation in Europe, Fantini, 'La liberalizzazione del trasporto ferrovario', 33-4. obligations for the company, which include the tariffs to be charged; financial penalties are also included for breach of the obligations. It did not, however, include the detailed service prescription characteristic of the UK franchises; services were based on the existing Trenitalia patterns. Similarly, the new ten-year contract from 2017 bases services on existing patterns but with requirements for quality improvements and investment. In the case of regional services, the regions are required by law to approve three-yearly plans for services, which specify the network and the organisation of services, integration with other modes, the resources to be made available, tariffs and the arrangements for monitoring. These are then implemented by means of contracts with operators, with a maximum duration of six years, renewable once, specifying service standards and tariff structures in detail. 82 For example, the contract between the Lazio region, which includes Rome, and Trenitalia is forty-one pages long, and sets out the public service compensation to be paid, requirements for investment in specified types of rolling stock, tariffs to be charged and penalties for breach.
Services are based on Trenitalia's existing ones, though further documents may specify services required. Such documents are very brief compared to UK franchises; for example, the specification in the contract for Piemonte runs to only thirteen pages. 83 In both national and regional contracts revenue risk is borne by the public authority; thus in the new Intercity contract, tariffs for public service provision and the compensation awarded to the operator are determined directly by the state with penalties and incentives based on operating performance. In principle regional contracts were to be awarded by competitive tendering since 1999, but the legal position is complex and the requirement of such tendering has been eroded. Indeed, funding has often been made conditional on the services being provided by Trenitalia, the incumbent operator. This has been criticised by the antitrust authority but in 2012 a new law which required the adoption of competitive tendering for local services was held to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court as infringing the rights of regions, and so it remained possible to use direct procurement. 84 Nevertheless, several regions have decided to proceed by competitive tendering. 85 The ART has now been given the responsibility for defining the principles on which competitive tendering should be based, and issued a set of rules for this in 2015. This includes rules relating to the award procedure, for example on transparency and avoiding conflicts of interest, and rules relating to passenger service standards in order to achieve uniform standards throughout the regions; these latter also apply to directly-awarded contracts.
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Transparency is limited. Most of the contracts are publicly available (though important annexes may not be) but there is no central repository or standard set of procedures for drawing them up. Ex ante scrutiny is very restricted. There is some consultation before regions develop their transport plans but these are only with a very limited number of organisations. The Lazio contract requires that its renewal should take place through a public procedure. 87 However, the type of bottom-up consultation used by the Welsh Government as discussed above was described by our Italian collaborator as 'science fiction for Italy'.
84 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza n. 199 del 2012. 85 The complex legal provisions are summarised at Fantini, 'La liberalizzazione del trasporto ferrovario', 36-7. 86 Candido, 'La Governance Dei Trasporti in Italia…' 126.
87 Artl 4(2).
Instead, there is some use of legal challenges in the courts but only after decisions have been taken. These have generally been unsuccessful.
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This complex picture raises a number of important issues which are relevant to the UK; once more, there is an apparent paradox between a system characterised by limited transparency but which appears to work reasonably smoothly avoiding the serious legitimacy problems in the UK. However as in Sweden, the regions have a major role in determining public service in Italian railways. This is part of a more recent trend towards regionalisation of the management and regulation of railways in Europe; thus a comparative study of the governance of competition in rail found that regionalisation was a major characteristic of all six countries studied, with the exception of the UK. It concluded that such regionalisation had produced satisfactory results.
89
The second key point is that there is a well-established system of contracts setting out public service requirements. These have been criticised for their vagueness, but they have avoided the highly complex and detailed specifications characteristic of UK franchise agreements. This is in part because of the availability of a single dominant operator with whom long-term relations can be built up. In addition, revenue risk is borne by the public authorities so there is no need for complex formulae to allocate risk. Together, these factors appear to have avoided the serious lack of trust so characteristic of the UK, especially given the rooting of public service norms in constitutional requirements. The different cultures and background in Sweden and Italy might seem to make it very difficult to draw lessons for the UK. However, we would suggest that this overseas experience can feed into a number of possible scenarios for change in the provision of passenger rail services.
More competition?
One criticism of franchising is that it is anti-competitive as it severely restricts competition in the market place for the provision of rail services, and so it should be supplemented or 91 Ibid., para. 6.18. 92 Ibid., para. 6.54.
It is highly unlikely that these reforms will replace the franchising system. First, the report makes it clear that they are not appropriate for the whole of the rail network, but rather for the three main intercity routes: the East Coast Main Line, the West Coast Main Line and the Great Western routes, with the possible addition of the Midland Main Line. Some system such as franchising would need to be maintained for the rest of the network. Second, the heavily used nature of the UK rail network, particularly in the case of these lines, would be likely to cause capacity problems which would limit the scope for new entry. The Department for Transport has now announced that HS2 will initially take the form of an integrated franchise with InterCity West Coast and there will be a single operator . 94 Third, the Authority's proposals will do nothing to minimise the problems of fragmentation of the railway system; indeed, they are likely to make it worse with a proliferation of different operators. Moreover, increased open access would also complicate even more the already highly-complex fares system which has been heavily criticised in passenger surveys.
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Finally, whilst operators facing increased competition may be incentivised to better 93 Ibid., paras 6.12-14. performance, it is equally likely that even more regular and diverse competitions could also compromise the trust of existing operators that are used to competition but who believe in the core rationale of competition for the market, namely the limitation of the market to a community of trusted providers tasked with exercising exclusive rights.
A return to public ownership?
With the re-classification of Network Rail as a public body by the Office for National
Statistics in 2014 and related changes to its borrowing arrangements, the core of the rail system is now in public ownership, and the Shaw Report on the future of Network Rail has made it clear that wholesale privatisation is not a current option. 96 One possibility for the future would be to take this process further by taking the franchises back in to public hands as they expire, possibly using the model adopted temporarily for the East Coast main line franchise through use of a public sector operator. This is the policy of the opposition Labour party and the trade unions, and from polling evidence seems to have public support; it also has its academic advocates; further, as mentioned above, there is already extensive participation in the operation of services by publicly-owned overseas companies. 97 98 Gourvish, British Rail 19745-97, ch. 4. However, it is unlikely that it will be possible to return to the old days of British Rail even if this were desirable. There are doubts as to the government's capacity to undertake the task; the public sector operator of last resort was wound up in in 2015 and replaced by a publicprivate partnership. 99 Further, EU law also requires a much clearer identification of state aid for public service requirements than was the case with the old British Rail public service obligations. The EU Public Services Obligation Regulation provides that exclusive rights and/or compensation must be allocated through the use of public service contracts, with a maximum of fifteen years duration (this can be extended where there are special investment needs); 100 however, the general principles of EU law require that public service compensation be clearly identified and costed in advance as a result of the Altmark case in 2003. 101 As the experience of other European countries shows, this in no way precludes public ownership, and of course the future effect of EU provisions in the UK is uncertain after Brexit; however, any publicly owned system would still most likely be dependent on the use of contracts to show the transparent use of public funds (as in the Italian case). This may be highly desirable on accountability grounds but limits the possibility of simple reliance on administrative coordination. In any event, any return to public ownership would still need to address the concerns raised in this article, and we shall now suggest how this could be done either with such ownership or with the retention of private operators.
Regionalisation and concessions?
There is another future possibility which will retain the use of contractual relations but in a North, a consortium of local authorities acting in partnership with the Department; these will become part of the Transport for the North partnership when the latter gains statutory recognition under the Act. As noted above, this reflects a more general trend in European rail towards greater regionalisation; in both Sweden and Italy regional authorities play a major role in tendering and in the setting of public service requirements. It also fits with other trends in the organisation of the railways; the Shaw report on the future of Network Rail recommended large-scale devolution to routes which would broadly reflect regional structures, and the possibility of such devolution was also supported in the Brown report.
In the regions, the possibility of open access competition is limited, as regional and commuter services predominate, and are excluded from the recommendations of the Competition and Markets Authority discussed above. They also require particularly strong public service requirements and monitoring, whilst the opportunities for innovation by operating companies are relatively limited. Thus the most appropriate model would seem to be that of a concession of the sort already used for London and Merseyside, with revenue risk carried by the public authority, which also sets fares. This could be combined with the development of deep alliances with routes of a devolved Network Rail (as envisaged in the Department's December 2016 announcement referred to above), the use of concessions avoiding many uncertainties associated with franchising. Such a solution has been strongly advocated by Transport for London based on its own experience of using concessions.
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The counter example is that of the GTR referred to briefly above. Though formally a franchise, this is characterised as a management contract. In reality, it is more like a UK concession in that a fee is paid to GTR to cover its operating costs and a small operating margin with revenue risk borne by the Department rather than the operator; however, unlike London and Merseyside, this contract is managed centrally rather than through locally accountable transport authorities. In the context of a serious industrial dispute resulting in the wholesale cancellation of trains, a common criticism has been that there has been little incentive on the company to improve performance notwithstanding an apparent incentive regime to meet quality standards on customer experience and performance benchmarks.
However, as noted above, the problem seems less to do with the allocation of risk and more to do with a failure to monitor performance properly, to apply remedial measures to rectify performance, to design adequate penalty systems and to the unwillingness of government, which supports the company in the dispute, to trigger and enforce them. 103 Regionalisation could also create the risk of horizontal fragmentation, but this would be much less disruptive than the current vertical fragmentation between infrastructure owner and train operator. transferred to the franchise holder and instead there will be a performance-based management contract with incentive mechanisms.
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Conclusion
Due to a rail privatisation perceived as threatening uneconomic but socially-desirable services, and the continued unpopularity (and often low quality service) of the privatised operators, the UK rail environment has been characterised by extremely low trust. Flexible use of franchise contracts which gives operators space for responsiveness and innovation has simply not proved possible. Instead there has been a crude form of regulation characterised by the highly complex and over-prescriptive franchise agreements, coupled with ambiguity on the centrally important issue of risk transfer. Such attempts as there have been to build trust by increased transparency have not succeeded, especially as transparency in relation to the operation and monitoring of the contracts is very restricted, as is shown strongly by the GTR fiasco. By contrast, it was made clear to us that in Italy the existence of an established dominant operator created relationships which were characterised by a higher degree of trust, something also reinforced by a strong public service tradition and indirectly by underlying constitutional norms.
107 This is what explains the different forms of governance of public service in rail transport in the two nations. In Sweden the major role for the regions and a different approach to risk, in which revenue risk is borne by regional authorities, also seems to have produced a much more stable system. These successes result notwithstanding less transparency than in the UK. The changes we have proposed on the basis of study of other systems, in particular regionalisation, the assumption of greater risk by public authorities and a more stable set of concessions, may provide a means by which the UK system can move away from highly detailed and prescriptive, low-trust norms towards a more collaborative and responsive mode of governance for our rail services over time. The usual argument deployed against this is that our proposed changes would restrict opportunities for innovation and a flexible response to changing customer demand by operators. 108 However, in the UK the opportunities for innovation and flexibility have always been limited. At the point of privatisation it was considered necessary for franchises to be stipulative to compensate for lack of trust and uncertainty in market pressure; whilst better performance monitoring over the years should have engendered trust and reduced prescription, the trend towards over-stipulation continues without flexibility or innovation. Uncertainty in franchising policy and recurring issues with existing franchises suggest that, whilst there remains a need for control in the continuing absence of trust, concession-style agreements may continue to offer that control but in the form of more adaptable contractual techniques that are better equipped to deal with economic and other uncertainty and the prevalence of devolution in all its forms.
More clearly defined allocations of risk, more broadly informed specifications and wellplanned systems of performance monitoring, may shift the balance away from what has been characteristic of rail franchises, namely misplaced exercises of public control through excessively specified contracts on issues of quality and over-reliance on the threat of penalties as a poor substitute for effective contract management. Concessions may do more than create stability and incentivise compliance with a contract in the short term. Concessions may lead contracting parties to think about contracts for rail services as opportunities for the development of long-term business relations that look beyond short-termism to strategic 108 See Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation, 176, 192. 
